

*[Excerpt contains pages from "Uneasy Allies: U.S. Relations with Saudi Arabia 1938-present, written as a senior thesis at Mary Baldwin College in Fall 2009. A full copy available on request.]*

## Chapter One: Introduction

Since February 1945 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt received King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, as a guest on the USS *Quincy*, the United States has enjoyed especially close ties with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Although at times the relationship has been tested both governments have maintained publicly that the unannounced alliance has enduring benefits. The intention of this paper is to assess for the United States whether those benefits outweigh any externalities, and ultimately analyze whether U.S.-Saudi relations advance the American national interest.

The concept of a "national interest" is most central to the realist theory of international relations, which assumes that because the international system is anarchic, and individuals are power seeking, a state must accumulate power to attain security. Under the umbrella of realism there are several schools of thought. Classical realism outlined by Hans Morgenthau is predicated on a Hobbesian interpretation of human nature<sup>1</sup>: man is inherently warlike and absent an authority over states, a state of war frequently prevails in the international system.<sup>2</sup> In classical realism, the national interest could loosely be defined as clubbing one's neighbor, before oneself is clubbed. Defensive realism primarily outlined by Kenneth Waltz suggests that the quest for power is dictated by the anarchic international system;<sup>3</sup> states accrue only enough power to maintain the status quo by deterring attack, while avoiding overdeveloping their military capabilities in such a way that upsets the balance of power.<sup>4</sup> Here the national interest is maintaining the status quo and preventing one state from dominating the international system. Finally, there is the school of

offensive realism, explicated by John J. Mearsheimer in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*...

## Chapter Two: The Arabian Peninsula, 1700 – 1924

*"The inhabitants made but a feeble resistance; and the conqueror put to the sword all the men and male children of every age. Whilst they executed this horrible butchery, a Wahhabite doctor cried from the top of a tower, 'Kill, strangle all the infidels who give companions to God.'" – Ali Bey.<sup>5</sup>*

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia comprises 2,149,690 square kilometers in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula and today is home to 28,686,633 people.<sup>6</sup> To the north, the Kingdom shares a border with Jordan and Iraq, to the south Yemen and Oman, Qatar, and in the east, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>7</sup> [See Map, Appendix A] In a country larger than France, Germany, Spain and Sweden combined,<sup>8</sup> important regional differences with political implications remain. The al-Hijaz, running along the edge of the Red sea is Saudi Arabia's more modern region. From the time of the Prophet Muhammed and before, religious pilgrims to Mecca and Medina came through the port city of Jeddah and often stayed creating a diverse merchant class reflecting traditions and cultures from across the Muslim world.<sup>9</sup> From 1201 to 1924 Hashemite kings ruled the al-Hijaz and acted as protectors for pilgrims on the Hajj.<sup>10</sup><sup>11</sup> The Hashemite royal family, now on the throne of Jordan, continues to have popular support in the al-Hijaz, particularly in and around Medina.<sup>12</sup> Far from a cohesive nation-state, John Bradley observed Saudis in Jeddah preferring to be called "al-Hijazi" in person and in comments given to foreign media sources.<sup>13</sup>

*[Pages Omitted for Excerpt.]*

In 1924, Abdul Aziz declared a *jihad* against the newly self-appointed caliph King Hussein of Jordan, providing the Ikhwan with reason to move north into the Al-Hijaz and reclaim the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.<sup>14</sup> In August of that year the Ikhwan captured the city of Taif, killing four hundred men, women and children.<sup>15</sup> As Wahabbi warriors were reported to have done a century earlier, the Ikhwan engaged in the practice of disemboweling pregnant women.<sup>16</sup> According to the British diplomatic record of the time, “There is evidence that the invaders showed religious fanaticism. They constantly addressed their victims as *kuffar* (infidels)... and *mushrikin* (polytheists).”<sup>17</sup> In all the House of Saud’s third conquest of the Arabian Peninsula was no less violent than the first. According to one scholar 400,000 people were killed or wounded,<sup>18</sup> including approximately 40,000 public executions and 350,000 amputations, with special cruelty reserved for the subjugation of the Shi’ia population in the east.<sup>19</sup> In December of 1924 the Abdul Aziz’s forces entered Mecca and he declared himself King of the Al-Hijaz and the Sultan of Najd and Her Dependencies creating what is today recognized as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.<sup>20</sup> As official state policy Abdul Aziz dismantled the religious plurality that existed in the cradle of Islam. According to Mai Yamani, “Prior to the unification, in the great mosques of Mecca and Medina, all the Islamic schools of thought were represented. They had all the Sunni schools of thought; they had the Shi’a; they had each one their own imam and somehow in different corners. It was after the unification of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia... A process of national homogeneity was attempted [with a move toward] the Wahhabi Islamic thought...”<sup>21</sup> According to

Hamid Algar, victims of this final conquest included brightly colored flowerpots  
“deemed to offend common decency with their bright colors.”<sup>22</sup>

### Chapter Three: Economic Partners, 1938 – 2009

*"Our relationship there is no different than our relationship would be in any other country... Sure there are customs. There are things - there are things that you do and don't do, doing business in Saudi Arabia, that unless you are aware of the customs and so forth, you can insult people, and you don't get many business contracts that way."*<sup>23</sup>

In 1931, Charles R. Crane an American businessman and philanthropist was invited to a meeting with King Abdul-Aziz in Jeddah.<sup>24</sup> Crane was known for his development efforts in Yemen and was asked by the King to arrange for a geological survey of the Kingdom looking principally for water and gold.<sup>25</sup> Before the discovery of oil the only income for the Kingdom came from Muslim pilgrims making the yearly Hajj to Mecca, and the sale of dates grown in the eastern provinces. Financed by Crane a mining team headed by Karl Twitchell came to Saudi Arabia and found a significant aquifer near Jeddah, but no gold.<sup>26</sup> Undeterred and desperate for cash, King Abdul Aziz suggested prospecting for oil, which had recently been discovered in nearby Bahrain.<sup>27</sup> With a similar geologic make up Twitchell predicted that, “if the Bahrain well proved a success, it was logical that commercial oil would be found in Hasa but in greater quantities because of its much greater area.”<sup>28</sup> Twitchell negotiated a concession for the rights to any future oil for Standard Oil of California (SoCal) with exclusive rights to the oil for 60 years.<sup>29</sup> After drilling several test holes with no result, on March 3<sup>rd</sup> 1938, a well known as

Dammam Number 7 proved to be commercially viable.<sup>30</sup> The Dammam 7 well alone would produce more than 32 million barrels of oil before being taken off line in 1982.<sup>31</sup>

*[Pages Omitted for Excerpt.]*

The experience of Citicorp is symptomatic of U.S.-Saudi economic relations. Citicorp, like other large contracting and banking firms, tried to garner a corner of the Saudi market and lost \$30 million in a country with a gross domestic product of \$481.6 billion a year.<sup>32</sup> Firms like Bechtel and Aramco often profited in the Kingdom though their in-country employees were denied freedom of religion and subjected to the Saudi code of conduct; their profits came from American consumers asked to pay increasingly high prices for gasoline and heating oil while Saudi princes and the elite took 5% in “commissions.” Smaller firms found their contracts disregarded, and individual workers were left at the mercy of their employer. The vast amounts of money from these contracts corrupted the moral fiber of big business as well as the State and Commerce Departments, leading to business dealings that inaccurately reflected the basic principles that made America great. This same corruption prevented the U.S. government from forcefully intervening on behalf of Citicorp, Bucheit International, John McDonald and other American interests that lost out in Saudi Arabia.

#### Chapter Four: Military Ally 1949 – 2009

*“We need their oil and they need our protection.” – Marshall Wylie<sup>33</sup>*

The iconic image of U.S.-Saudi relations is of King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud and President Franklin Roosevelt engaged in a lively discussion on the U.S.S. *Quincy* in Egypt's Great Bitter Lake.<sup>34</sup> Returning from Yalta, the *Quincy* docked so that the two world leaders could discuss issues of international importance.<sup>35</sup> The meeting cemented warm diplomatic relations between the two countries that began in February 1943. President Franklin D. Roosevelt designated Saudi Arabia strategically crucial to the United States.<sup>36</sup> Although not a formal ally, this made the Kingdom eligible to receive Lend-Lease assistance: "I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States."<sup>37</sup> According to Rachel Bronson, "between 1940 and 1947, the United States provided Saudi Arabia with \$99 million in aid, only 25% of which was meant to be paid back."<sup>38</sup> Roosevelt explained to James F. Byrnes, Director of the Office of War Mobilization, "in view of the strategic location of Saudi Arabia, the important oil resources of that country and the prestige of King [Abdul Aziz] throughout the Arab world, the defense of Saudi Arabia [is] vital to the defense of the United States."<sup>39</sup>

In 1943, World War Two and specifically operations in the Pacific Ocean were ongoing. The privilege of flying over Saudi Arabia saved American and allied forces time and fuel, but being able to land and refuel would be more advantageous. Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote to Edward Stettinius Jr., the Acting Secretary of War, "The most important military interest in Saudi Arabia is oil and closely following this in importance is the right to construct airfields, the use of air space and the right to make aerial surveys in connection therewith."<sup>40</sup>

*[Pages Omitted for Excerpt.]*

In 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Saudi Defense Minister Prince

Sultan announced the closure of the Prince Sultan Air Base.<sup>41</sup> The Air Force command center located there was moved to Qatar.<sup>42</sup> Both parties insisted that moving the 5,000 service men was a mutual decision. “This does not mean we requested them to leave Saudi Arabia, but as long as their operation is over, they will leave,” said Prince Sultan.<sup>43</sup> For the Americans, the al-Udeid Air Base was more hospitable “The Qataris welcomed the U.S. military with open arms and placed no restrictions on the ‘rules of engagement’ for U.S. warplanes operating from there.”<sup>44</sup> Four hundred American servicemen remained in Saudi Arabia as part of the USMTM joint training mission, but the large-scale presence of American troops that had rankled the Muslim world had come to an end.<sup>45</sup>

In 1991 neither the United States nor the Saudis could have known the ramifications that ultimately came from the U.S. presence at Prince Sultan Air Base. The decision to remain in Saudi Arabia had lasting consequences. In 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa called, “*Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places*.”<sup>46</sup> Though little noticed at the time, this open letter published in *Al Quds Al Arabi*, a London-based Arabic language paper, was the first shot in the war on terrorism, which would come to dominate U.S.-Saudi relations after September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001.

#### Chapter Five: Partners Against Terror 1995-2009

*“The world cannot defeat terrorism without Saudi Arabia defeating terrorism on its own grounds” – Francis Frago Townsend<sup>47</sup>*

For the United States, involvement with Saudi Arabia has always required a willful ignorance about the ideology of the Kingdom. While America was founded on

ideas of equality, plurality and freedom, the al-Saud family consolidated power on the Arabian Peninsula by imposing one strict interpretation of Islam at the point of the sword. In buying Saudi oil and providing the Kingdom development aid and military training, the United States funded and stabilized a government that willfully spread a religious ideology inherently toxic to American values. In *What Went Wrong*, Bernard Lewis writes,

*“Imagine if the Ku Klux Klan or Aryan Nation obtained total control of Texas and had at its disposal all the oil revenues, and used this money to establish a network of well-endowed schools and colleges all over Christendom peddling their particular brand of Christianity. This was what the Saudis have done with Wahhabism. The oil money has enabled them to spread this fanatical, destructive form of Islam all over the Muslim world and among Muslims in the West. Without oil and the creation of the Saudi kingdom, Wahhabism would have remained a lunatic fringe.”<sup>48</sup>*

*[Pages Omitted for Excerpt.]*

All of these incidents paint a picture of a country that on an institutional and personal level is unwilling and unable to restrain and is in some cases complicit in international Islamic terrorism. There are suggestions that what is known is the tip of the iceberg, and underneath the surface waits something larger and more dangerous.

<sup>49</sup> During an April 2002 CIA interrogation of al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah, U.S. Special Forces agents posed as Saudi intelligence agents, believing that Zubaydah would be more fearful of the possible interrogation techniques Saudi agents might use.<sup>50</sup> “Zubaydah seemed relieved rather than frightened,” and instructed the agents to call two telephone numbers he produced from memory,

saying, “He will tell you what to do.”<sup>51</sup> “He” referred to Prince Ahmed bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz, whose private home and cell phone numbers Zubaydah had committed to memory.<sup>52</sup> Zubaydah remembered the phone numbers of other Saudi princes he believed would help as well.<sup>53</sup> Later he told the interrogators that Ahmed knew before 9/11 that there would be an al-Qaeda attack in America around that date.<sup>54</sup>

As outlined above, Saudi Arabia spends a significant amount of money and energy spreading Wahhabi Islam around the world, supplanting local Islamic culture and frequently funding extremism. Money from Saudi charities seems to flow to terrorist activities as if from a fire hose, and internally the Saudis are either criminally negligent in preventing, or an accomplice to, terrorist actions. In a report to the Defense Policy Board in 2002, Laurent Murawiec said, “ the Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to food-soldier, from ideologist to cheer leader.”<sup>55</sup> The question becomes then not whether the Saudis are involved in terrorism but why extremism has the hold over Saudi society that it does.

#### Chapter Six: Internal Unrest 1929-2008

*“Ten, 20 years ago, we had the luxury of time. We could choose the kind of reform pace we wanted... now we either reform or collapse.” - Turki al-Hamad<sup>56</sup>*

In 1979 the Saudi government first experienced the true threat posed by extremists in the modern era.<sup>57</sup> The event is little remembered today in Western circles though at the time it was a massive security crisis. During the Hajj five hundred men, led by Juhayman al-Otaibi, sneaked weapons into the Grand

Mosque in Mecca and took over, holding thousands of pilgrims hostage.<sup>58</sup> The men felt that the royal family was insufficiently pious to rule a Muslim nation and believed one of their leaders to be the *Mahdi*, a messianic figure in Islam.<sup>59</sup> Some pilgrims were convinced by Juhayman's rhetoric and joined the uprising.<sup>60</sup> Losing control of the mosque was bad enough, but for days the Saudi government struggled with how to resolve the conflict.<sup>61</sup> Many in the Saudi armed forces were unwilling to fight fellow Saudis, fellow Wahhabis on holy ground, some genuinely believing the Mahdi had returned. As a result Interior Minister Nayef arranged for two battalions of Pakistani Muslims to fight the rebels without success.<sup>62</sup> Juhayman's group occupied the mosque for ten days at the peak of the hajj, and order was only restored with the help of three French Special Forces officers who converted to Islam so they could enter the holy city.<sup>63</sup> In retaking the mosque two hundred people died, and afterward sixty men involved in the plot were beheaded.<sup>64</sup> The seizure of the Grand Mosque is a microcosm of all the elements of internal unrest present in Saudi society to this day: religious extremism, political repression and a restless populace. The impetus for Juhayman to lead the takeover had historical roots in a 1929 uprising, when the Saudi royal family killed his grandfather.

*[Pages Omitted for Excerpt.]*

This is the paradoxical threat that faces the Saudis. Even as the government attempts to crack down on religious extremism, the government has failed to acknowledge the pernicious role their own ideology has played in the rise of al-Qaeda and international Islamic terrorism. The royal family is threatened by a growing Saudi underclass that has not shared in the oil wealth and increasingly is susceptible to the lure of Islamic terrorism. At the same time, the Saudis derive their

authority from the propagation of the religious ideology that created the religious extremists. Murawiec finds the perfect analogy. "In Mary Shelley's novel, Doctor Frankenstein, horrified by the monster he has created, tries to destroy it by any means possible. The Saudi kingdom does not seek in any way to destroy its monstrous offspring. It barely goes so far as to treat it as an illegitimate son."<sup>65</sup>

Newspaper columnist Sulaiman al-Hattlan wrote in 2003, "Though few would publicly admit it, Saudis have become hostages of the backward agenda of a small minority of bin Laden supporters who in effect have hijacked our society... Because of the dominance of Wahhabism Saudi society has been exposed to only one school of thought, one that teaches hatred of Jews, Christians and certain Muslims, like Shiites and liberal and moderate Sunnis. But we Saudis must acknowledge that our real enemy is religious fanaticism. We have to stop talking about the need for reform and actually start it, particularly in education."<sup>66</sup> Unfortunately, his clarion call did not reach the average Saudi citizen. It was published in *The New York Times*.

### Chapter Seven: Criticism

*The two peoples remain very foreign to each other. Very few westerners really understand the Saudi mentality, and very few Saudis become as western in thought as they do in manner -- David Long<sup>67</sup>*

Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, criticism of Saudi Arabia has become a fashionable if unpopular cottage industry. Much of the evidence, however, shows that U.S.-Saudi relations have never been uncontroversial. As referenced previously, in the early 1950s there was public debate about selling arms to the Saudis and maintaining the Dhahran airfield in such an intolerant country. Still critical, comprehensive works on American relations with Saudi Arabia have surfaced only in

the last ten years and they have often been attacked and dismissed in the press. For a long time the history of Saudi Arabia was told from one laudatory perspective.

The first sources of documenting the Kingdom came from Aramco, which had obvious business interests painting the Saudis in a positive light.<sup>68</sup> The first Aramco histories of the country completely ignore the violent conquest of the Arabian Peninsula and instead focus on romantic descriptions of nomadic Bedouin riding camels across the desert.<sup>69</sup> Early Aramco executives described Wahhabi theology as “Muslim Unitarianism,” and while it is true that Wahhabis believe in the unity of God, Wahhabism bears no resemblance to Christian Unitarianism, a denomination known for its tolerance and liberalism.<sup>70</sup> Aramco uncritically carried the Saudi message to the United States, encouraging President Truman in 1948 not to recognize Israel “for fear of offending the Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.”<sup>71</sup>

*[Pages Omitted for Excerpt.]*

In ignoring incidents like these many in the West make the weak and morally suspect argument that Saudi Arabia in particular, and the Middle East in general, should be held to a different standard. In an interview Bernard Lewis said, “All too often European and American policies toward the Arab world have been predicated on an unspoken assumption: that these people are incapable of democracy, that it's inevitable that they will be ruled by tyrants and that they are on a lower level of civilizations. We hold them to a lower level both in what we expect from them and what they may expect from us. We don't expect these people to live by civilized rules. In this perception, the aim of policy is to ensure that they will be ruled by friendly, not hostile, tyrants. I find this approach deeply insulting, morally reprehensible, and, in the world of today, politically unworkable.”<sup>72</sup>

## Chapter Eight: An Inconclusive Conclusion

*"I've said several times since I've been President of our country that I don't believe there is any other nation with whom we've had better friendship and a deeper sense of cooperation than we've found in Saudi Arabia." – President Jimmy Carter<sup>73</sup>*

The intention stated in the introduction to this paper was to assess for the United States whether the benefits of our relationship with Saudi Arabia outweigh any externalities and to analyze whether U.S.-Saudi relations advance the American national interest. The answer is no.

As a partner in trade, America benefited greatly. Two-way trade with Saudi Arabia amounted to \$19.3 billion dollars in 2000.<sup>74</sup> But that money fed a fundamentally corrupt Saudi economy and in so doing often condoned discrimination against U.S. citizens and Israel.

As a military ally, Saudi Arabia got lucrative arms deals and training contracts while denying the United States a coveted base on the Arabian Peninsula. Even as the Saudis funded U.S. anti-communist efforts, they were buying nuclear technology from Communist China. Since its creation, as a matter of state policy Saudi Arabia has exported a religious ideology that promotes hatred of Christians, Jews and the West and ultimately was complicit in the rise of the radical Islamic fundamentalism that threatens American interests today.

When the Saudis needed American aid in the form of development assistance, military aid and protection, the United States has responded. The Saudi Arabian Joint Economic Commission operated for twenty-five years, providing the Kingdom with the development they requested. The U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) has been training Saudi Arabians continually since 1953. When American weaponry and training were insufficient for the Kingdom to defend itself, the United States intervened in the Gulf War.

*[Pages Omitted for Excerpt.]*

Pushing the royal family to reform needs to be but one component in the critical reorientation of U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia. In *An End to Evil*, Richard Perle and David Frum write that the United States must “tell the truth about Saudi Arabia.”<sup>75</sup> The whole of our history with the Saudis has been largely private to the detriment of American interests. For too long, questioning Saudi Arabia’s position as a favored ally has been a political sacred cow in American political and academic circles. The abundance of sources cited below suggests this may be changing. Only time will tell if this change will be a more lasting and unqualified benefit to American interests than our relationship with Saudi Arabia has been since 1938.

---

## CHAPTER ONE

<sup>1</sup> Referenced in Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (First., p. 402). New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

<sup>2</sup> Vasquez, J. (1986). Hobbes (pp. 204-206). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Retrieved November 23, 2009, from <http://academic.mbc.edu/gbowen/Hobbes.htm>.

<sup>3</sup> Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (First., p. 402). New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 15.

<sup>4</sup> Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (First., p. 402). New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 19.

## CHAPTER TWO

<sup>5</sup> Gold, D. (2003). *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (p. 309). Regency Publishing, Inc.

<sup>6</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. (2009, October 7). Saudi Arabia. World Factbook. Retrieved October 24, 2009, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html>.

<sup>7</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. (2009, October 7). Saudi Arabia. World Factbook. Retrieved October 24, 2009, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html>.

<sup>8</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>9</sup> Bradley, J. R. (2006). *Saudi Arabia Exposed : Inside a Kingdom in Crisis, Updated Edition* (p. 256).

<sup>10</sup> The hajj is a pilgrimage to Mecca, during which Muslims perform various rituals associated with the lives the biblical figures Hagar and Ishmael as well as the Prophet Mohammed. It is a requirement for able-bodied Muslims, who can afford it, to make the hajj once in their lifetime.

<sup>11</sup> Bradley, J. R. (2006). *Saudi Arabia Exposed : Inside a Kingdom in Crisis, Updated Edition* (p. 256).

<sup>12</sup> Bradley, J. R. (2006). *Saudi Arabia Exposed : Inside a Kingdom in Crisis, Updated Edition* (p. 256).

<sup>13</sup> Bradley, J. R. (2006). *Saudi Arabia Exposed : Inside a Kingdom in Crisis, Updated Edition* (p. 256).

<sup>14</sup> Gold, D. (2003). *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (p. 309). Regency Publishing, Inc.

<sup>15</sup> Gold, D. (2003). *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (p. 309). Regency Publishing, Inc.

<sup>16</sup> Yaroslav, T. (2007). *The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam's Holiest Shrine and the Birth of Al-Qaeda* (First., p. 263). New York: Doubleday.

---

<sup>17</sup> Gold, D. (2003). *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (p. 309). Regency Publishing, Inc.

<sup>18</sup> Algar, H. (2002). *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay* (First., p. 84). United States: Islamic Publications International.

<sup>19</sup> Algar, H. (2002). *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay* (First., p. 84). United States: Islamic Publications International.

<sup>20</sup> Gold, D. (2003). *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (p. 309). Regency Publishing, Inc.

<sup>21</sup> Posner, G. (2006). *Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection* (p. 272). Random House

<sup>22</sup> Algar, H. (2002). *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay* (First., p. 84). United States: Islamic Publications International.

### Chapter Three

<sup>23</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>24</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>25</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>26</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>27</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>28</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>29</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>30</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>31</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>32</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. (2009, October 7). Saudi Arabia. World Factbook. Retrieved October 24, 2009, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html>.

### Chapter Four

- 
- <sup>33</sup> Aburish, S. K. (1995). *The Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall of the House of Saud*. (p. 302). New: St. Martin's Press.
- <sup>34</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- <sup>35</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- <sup>36</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- <sup>37</sup> Bronson, R. (2008). *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (p. 384). Oxford University Press.
- <sup>38</sup> Bronson, R. (2008). *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (p. 384). Oxford University Press.
- <sup>39</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- <sup>40</sup> Ottaway, D. (2008). *The King's Messenger* (p. 270). New York: Walker Publishing Company Inc.
- <sup>41</sup> Garamone, J. (n.d.). Saudi Base to Close, Ops Center Moves to Qatar. U.S. Department of Defense News. April 29 2003, . Retrieved November 21, 2009, from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29047>.
- <sup>42</sup> Gordon, M. R., & Schmitt, E. (2003, April 28). U.S. to Move Air Base to Qatar. NYTimes.com. Retrieved November 21, 2009, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/28/international/worldspecial/28BASE.html>.
- <sup>43</sup> U.S. Begins Moving Military Out of Saudi Arabia. (2003, April 29). FOXNews.com. Retrieved November 21, 2009, from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,85446,00.html>.
- <sup>44</sup> Ottaway, D. (2008). *The King's Messenger* (p. 270). New York: Walker Publishing Company Inc.
- <sup>45</sup> U.S. Begins Moving Military Out of Saudi Arabia. (2003, April 29). FOXNews.com. Retrieved November 21, 2009, from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,85446,00.html>.
- <sup>46</sup> Bin Laden's Fatwa. (n.d.). PBS.org. Retrieved November 15, 2009, from [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa\\_1996.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html).

## CHAPTER FIVE

- <sup>47</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- <sup>48</sup> Gold, D. (2003). *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (p. 309). Regency Publishing, Inc.
- <sup>49</sup> This incident is contained exclusively in reporting by Gerald Posner and is unconfirmed by other sources. It bears quoting at length his justification for including in his books the Zubaydah allegations: “ the

---

information about those raids, the capture of top al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah, and his subsequent transfer, interrogation, and the results of those questioning sessions comes from two government sources, both in a position to know details of Zubaydah's capture and interrogation, as well as his admissions. Both sources separately provided information. Their accounts often overlapped and confirmed each other in important aspects. Without any possibility of independently verifying much of the information, I have had to make a judgment about the sources themselves. In this instance, I believe them to be credible, knowledgeable, and truthful about what transpired.” Professional authors found Posner’s account credible enough to include in their publications. Thus encouraged, I follow suit.

<sup>50</sup> Posner, G. (2006). *Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection* (p. 272). Random House.

<sup>51</sup> Posner, G. (2006). *Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection* (p. 272). Random House.

<sup>52</sup> Posner, G. (2006). *Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection* (p. 272). Random House.

<sup>53</sup> Posner, G. (2006). *Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection* (p. 272). Random House.

<sup>54</sup> Posner, G. (2006). *Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection* (p. 272). Random House.

<sup>55</sup> Baer, R. (2003). *Sleeping With the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude* (First.). New York: Crown Publishers.

## CHAPTER SIX

<sup>56</sup> Bradley, J. R. (2006). *Saudi Arabia Exposed : Inside a Kingdom in Crisis*, Updated Edition (p. 256).

<sup>57</sup> Yaroslav, T. (2007). *The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine and the Birth of Al-Qaeda* (First., p. 263). New York: Doubleday.

<sup>58</sup> Yaroslav, T. (2007). *The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine and the Birth of Al-Qaeda* (First., p. 263). New York: Doubleday.

<sup>59</sup> Yaroslav, T. (2007). *The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine and the Birth of Al-Qaeda* (First., p. 263). New York: Doubleday.

<sup>60</sup> Yaroslav, T. (2007). *The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine and the Birth of Al-Qaeda* (First., p. 263). New York: Doubleday.

<sup>61</sup> Yaroslav, T. (2007). *The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine and the Birth of Al-Qaeda* (First., p. 263). New York: Doubleday.

<sup>62</sup> Posner, G. (2006). *Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection* (p. 272). Random House

<sup>63</sup> Yaroslav, T. (2007). *The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine and the Birth of Al-Qaeda* (First., p. 263). New York: Doubleday.

---

<sup>64</sup> Cordesman, A. H., & Obaid, N. (2005). *National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.

<sup>65</sup> Murawiec, L. (2005). *Princes of Darkness: The Saudi Assault on the West* (First., p. 327). Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

<sup>66</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

<sup>67</sup> Lippman, T. W. (2004). *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (First., p. 347). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

<sup>68</sup> Bronson, R. (2008). *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (p. 384). Oxford University Press.

<sup>69</sup> Bronson, R. (2008). *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (p. 384). Oxford University Press.

<sup>70</sup> Gold, D. (2003). *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (p. 309). Regency Publishing, Inc.

<sup>71</sup> Murawiec, L. (2005). *Princes of Darkness: The Saudi Assault on the West* (First., p. 327). Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

<sup>72</sup> Lewis, B. (2002, September 11). PAW September 11, 2002: Features. What Went Wrong. Retrieved February 22, 2009, from [http://www.princeton.edu/~paw/archive\\_new/PAW02-03/01-0912/features.html](http://www.princeton.edu/~paw/archive_new/PAW02-03/01-0912/features.html).

## CHAPTER EIGHT

<sup>73</sup> Bronson, R. (2008). *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (p. 384). Oxford University Press.

<sup>74</sup> Baer, R. (2003). *Sleeping With the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude* (First.). New York: Crown Publishers.

<sup>75</sup> Frum, D., & Perle, R. (2004). *An End to Evil*. New York: Random House.